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Institutional arrangements to determine loan repayment in Chile
Abstract
The major objective of this paper is to investigate institutional arrangements as determinant
of loan repayment in the Chilean financial market. A second aim is to analyze the effects of
these arrangements on borrowers’ behavior. Despite La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) classify
Chile as a French Civil Law country, the law and private arrangements have evolved
consistently with the capital market development to protect the rights of the creditors. This
is consistent with relatively low rates of bad loans, ranking from 1.1 to 2.0 percent in 1993-
1997.  We examine different variables which may be related to loan repayment; (a)
limitations on the access to credit, (b) macroeconomic stability, (c) collection technology,
(d) bankruptcy code, (e) information sharing, (f) the judicial system, (g) prescreening
techniques and (h) major changes in financial market regulation. Based on the discussion
presented in the paper plus regression analyses, we conclude that a satisfactory
performance of the Chilean credit market, in terms of loan repayments and credit market
development, hinges on a good information sharing system, an advanced collection
technology, a good macroeconomic performance, credit market development and major
changes in financial market regulation.
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1  Introduction
La  Porta et al. (1997, 1998) classified Chile as a French Civil Law country, which
according to them have poorer creditor rights protection and, consequently, narrower
financial markets. This paper is mainly motivated by Chile’s outstanding performance in
terms of bad debt as compared to other countries that fit within the same class. In fact,
looking at the international evidence, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) showed that the ratio
between non-performing loans and total loans is lower in Chile than in other economies at a
similar stage of development.
On the Chilean empirical evidence, Fuentes and Basch (1998) showed that Chile
experienced a process of banking disintermediation. This process was primarily due to the
entrance of institutional investors during the eighties (mainly private pension funds), and
the expansion of department stores as a source of credit, leasing companies and public debt
issues during the nineties. This process led to lower bank margins. For this reason, banks
moved into riskier segments, i.e., lending to individuals and to small business. Yet,
defaulted loans have not increased. Why was this so? More generally, what are the
determinants of loan repayment in Chile?
Based on the La Porta et al results, someone may conclude that to reach a higher
level of creditor’s right protection and, consequently to develop the capital market, it is
necessary to move from French Civil Law structure to a Common Law one. However, this
paper shows that despite Chile belongs to the French Civil Law group of countries, it is
possible to build institutional arrangements to protect creditor’s right and create borrower’s
incentives to repay in the financial market. Therefore, our objective is to study different
institutional arrangements that may determine the level of loan repayment. To accomplish
this goal it is necessary to control for macroeconomic variables to discern between ability
and willingness to repay.
Willingness to repay in the financial market is key to the existence of a healthy
financial system. Specifically, the institutional arrangements to assure the debtor’s payment
should be one of the main concerns of policy-makers that oversee the operation of the
banking system, since credit market failures generally derives from imperfect information
and/or limited enforcement (see  Besley, 1995). On the one hand, there is asymmetric
information that translates into moral hazard and adverse selection problems, as creditors
are only able to partially observe the behavior of the debtor. These issues may be
exacerbated in a situation where creditor rights are hard to enforce, since this increases the
probabilities that debtors can get away with default even in cases where they could repay
their debts.
On the other hand, there are risks to the debtor’s project, such as, economic shocks,
that may impair her ability to repay her loans. In Latin America many external crises over
the last twenty years have been generated by difficulties in the financial sector. For
instance, that was the case in Chile (1982), in Mexico during the recent so-called “tequila
effect” and in Argentina, etc. Sometimes, these external crises lead to a local currency6
devaluation (at least in the case of Chile and Mexico), that unleashes the crisis and
demonstrated the weakness of the financial system, in which debtors are unable to pay their
obligations. In this case, the economy faces a generalized crisis.
We examine three important variables, namely: the macroeconomic environment,
financial market regulation and information sharing. Using monthly data for 1986-1997 we
find that good macroeconomic performance and the introduction of white information
sharing is negatively related with past due loans. We explore the determinants of credit
market development considering yearly data. We show that good macroeconomic
performance plus major financial market reforms and information sharing explained the
credit market development.
We also discuss the effect of other determinants of the level of arrears in the credit
market. We group these additional factors in macroeconomic variables, legal environment
and private arrangements. Concerning the first group we examine the effect on past due
loans of access to credit. In terms of the legal environment, we study the degree of
efficiency of the judicial system, and the characteristics of the bankruptcy code. We also
study some private arrangements such as information sharing, prescreening techniques,
collection technology and corporate bonds as an example of private contracts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows international and national
evidence to motivate this research. Section 3 considers the analysis of the major
determinants of loan repayment and credit market development. Section 4 discusses other
determinants of loan repayment in Chile. The paper ends with our concluding remarks.
2  International Comparisons
 
As stated in the introduction, Chile was classified by La Porta et al. (1998) as a French
Civil Law country. According to their study, these countries are generally characterized by
poor creditor rights protection and less developed capital markets. However, looking at
individual country data, the Chilean capital market is relatively more developed than the
rest of the countries in the French Civil Law group.
The following table shows statistics on creditor rights protection and capital market
development as presented by La Porta et al. Panel A shows what they called measures of
law enforcement: efficiency of judicial system, index of rule of law, index of corruption
and risk of repudiation. All indices are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where the higher
value means higher efficiency of the judicial system, higher tradition of law and order,
lower level of corruption and lower risk of contract repudiation by the government.7
Table 2.1
Law Enforcement and Financial Development
Panel A: Rule of Law
Country Efficiency of
judicial system
Rule of law Corruption Risk of
contract
repudiation
Chile 7.25 7.02 5.30 6.80
French Origin Avg. 6.56 6.05 5.84 6.84
English Origin Avg. 8.15 6.46 7.06 7.41
German Origin Avg. 8.54 8.68 8.03 9.47
Scandinavian Origin Avg. 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.44
Sample Average 7.67 6.85 6.9 7.58






Chile 0.80 19.92 0.35 0.63
French Origin Avg. 0.21 10.00 0.19 0.45
English Origin Avg. 0.60 35.45 2.23 0.68
German Origin Avg. 0.46 16.79 0.12 0.97
Scandinavian Origin Avg. 0.30 27.76 2.14 0.57
Sample Average 0.40 21.59 1.02 0.59
Source: La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
Chile does not feature appreciable difference in the enforcement variables (Panel A)
with respect to the average of the French Civil Law countries except for the rule of law
variable, where it scores higher than other countries of this group. With the exception of
this variable, however, it scores lower than English origin countries. For all four
enforcement variables, it scores far worse than German and Scandinavian origin countries.
Accordingly, the development of the Chilean capital market should be comparable with the
rest of the French Civil Law countries. Panel B shows different indicators for capital
market development and Chile is above the average of the French Civil Law countries in all
the indexes, and it could be comparable to the countries with an English, German or
Scandinavian law.
More connected with the main topic in the paper is the data related to bad loans.
This is hard to measure for cross-country comparisons, because each economy has its own
regulation as to when a bank rates a loan as non-performing or past due. For example in
Chile banks rate a loan as a past due after 90 days while in Brazil it is after 60 days. If loan
loss reserves are measured as a proxy of non-performing loans, once again no single criteria
will be found. Despite these problems, it is interesting to analyze this kind of data for some8
countries. The following table shows statistics on past due loans and loan loss reserves for
different countries as reported in Jappelli and Pagano (1998).
Table 2.2


















Brazil 6.31 94 3.63 95
Chile 0.93 29 0.34 31
Colombia 7.34 24 1.74 27
Mexico 7.09 22 2.88 22
Peru 8.93 23 3.45 18
Australia 3.70 12 0.34 34
Canada 2.34 7 0.79 17
Germany 0.60 1596
Italy 5.21 235 1.74 250
Spain 4.74 19 0.98 163
Sweden 7.02 15 1.12 16
United Kingdom 0.16 59
United States 1.65 495 0.56 497
Source: Jappelli and Pagano (1998)
Again Chile shows very low levels of defaulted loans and it is more comparable to
developed countries than to the other Latin American countries. By way of an example,
non-performing loans in Chile were in the order of 1% over the last few years, which is
more similar to the US and Canada than to Peru or Brazil.
3  Major determinants of loan repayment and credit market development
Institutional arrangements  per se do not always adequately warrant the enforcement of
payment. That is, creditor’s rights are not completely protected. They could fail for many
reasons: an inefficient judicial system, a bad policy of third-party collateral or guarantees, a
lack of public dissemination of default data, etc.
We can identify at least three large groups of potential factors, which determine
loan repayments. The first one includes macroeconomic determinants. On the one hand,9
macroeconomic stability could be the reason for a low level of non-performing loans. On
the other hand, credit rationing could explain the low level of overdue loans, since banks
will lend money only to the high quality borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
The second group of determinants is related to regulation and enforcement system.
The main changes in the financial market regulation are among the key element to explain
development of the credit market and the low level of arrears. If a country has a clear set of
rules that protect creditor’s right combined with a an efficient supervision of the rules then
the creditors will have incentive to create some mechanism to ensure the repayment of a
loan. On the other hand, elements like efficiency of the judicial system and bankruptcy
code will be analyzed in section 4. If the rules of enforcement are inefficient, the cost of not
paying a debt could be lower than the benefit. Among the inefficiencies we can mention a
slow legal system and costly judicial proceedings.
The third set of variables is what we call private solutions to face the unwillingness
to repay a loan. This group includes information sharing system, prescreening techniques,
collection technology and private contracts. In many situations the financial system does
not have the information on either the level of the debt or the history of the debtor and then
the system is not in a position to limit the amount of loans. This is intensified by the lack of
a good supervisory system within the financial sector (Edwards, 1995). In this section will
measure the impact of information sharing on past due loans and credit market growth,
postponing the discussion of the other solutions to section 4.
3.1  Macroeconomic stability
A key issue in this study is to separate willingness to repay from the ability to repay in the
case of an unpaid loan. After the 1982 crisis, the Chilean economy experienced a high
growth rate of GDP (annual rate of 7.7% since 1986) attended by a decreasing inflation
rate. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of per capita GDP since 1960 up to 1997. After the big
drop in 1982-83, the economy started to recover with a strong upward trend ever since.10
Figure 3.1
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The next table shows the inflation rate for different decades. This statistic has been steadily
decreasing since 1990, showing the lowest inflation rate in the whole period. This explains
why the standard deviation of the inflation rate in the nineties is higher than that in the
eighties, when the inflation rate fluctuated less but with a higher average.
Table 3.1
Inflation rate
Decades Average Std. Dev. Coef. of Var.
60-69 24.85 12.11 0.4873
70-79 175.21 174.42 0.9955
80-89 20.69 6.28 0.3037
90-98 11.68 7.28 0.6234
Therefore, in the last decade Chile shows a more stable macroeconomic pattern, a feature
that coincides with the development of the financial market. Part of the explanation for the
low level of non-performing loans and the increasing development of the credit market is
likely to reside in the greater ability to repay associated with macroeconomic stability.11
3.2  Financial market regulation and the banking sector
It is well known that during the eighties the Latin American economies underwent a deep
financial and macroeconomic crisis. Chile was no exception. At the time of the Chilean
financial crisis that started in the middle of 1981 the economy was open to international
trade and to foreign financial markets. This dependence originated from all the reforms
implemented during the first years of the military government that took power in 1973. The
main features of the reform were the deep trade reform carried out in 1974-1979, the
opening of the capital account that started in 1978, the reduction in the size of government
in order to control inflation, the privatization of state-owned firms and commercial banks
(many of them expropriated by the former government) and the elimination of price
controls including the interest rate.
After several decades of financial repression, characterized by credit ceilings and
interest rate controls that generated a negative real interest rate, financial liberalization
brought about an overshooting of the interest rate and a high spread in the banking system.
According to De la  Cuadra and  Valdés (1992), banks were not prepared in terms of
technology, human capital and managerial ability to handle the new situation of a free
financial market. Therefore they tended to have riskier portfolios, higher interest rates and
spreads owing to a poor risk evaluation.
On the other hand, the same was true for the Superintendency of Banks and
Financial Institutions. Prior to the liberalization, the objective of this regulatory agency was
focused on enforcing credit and interest rate control. The agency lacked the know-how
required to monitor and control risk, primarily due to the absence of a prudential regulation
(De la Cuadra and Valdés).
Almost concomitantly with the complete opening of the capital account, Chilean
authorities implemented a fixed exchange rate system in June 1979, which brought about a
real appreciation of domestic currency and a substantial current account deficit financed
with foreign capital. In spite of the high amount of capital that entered Chile in 1981, the
real interest rate was as high as 35 per cent in pesos. By 1982 the supply of foreign capital
declined abruptly, the real interest rate remained high and the economy experienced a deep
recession
1. The fixed exchange rate system was finally abandoned in June 1982.
The Chilean financial sector was not ready to face the fast reform implemented. The
existence of implicit insurance to deposits created the well-known moral hazard problem in
bank lending and the absence of prudential supervision allowed banks to intermediate funds
toward related companies. Economic groups owned banks and related companies that went
bankrupt when external financial resources became scarce. These economic groups were
                                                       
1 GDP growth rate fell from 5.5 per cent in 1981 to -14.1 per cent in 1982, the unemployment rate increased
from 13.5 per cent to 21.3 per cent in those years (data from Institute of Economy, Universidad de Chile)12
especially affected by the devaluation of the peso during the second semester of 1982, with
the exception of export-oriented groups and with a low leverage in dollars
2.
Until 1982 the external debt crisis was a private sector crisis, but in 1983 the
government was forced by foreign banks to guarantee private external debt. Given the
dimension of the crisis, the economic authorities decided to bail out the banking system. In
1982, the Chilean Central Bank began to buy delinquent loans at their face value in order to
postpone banks’ losses. The banks had the obligation to repurchase those loans over time.
This, however, did not improve the banks’ solvency, it only was a makeshift solution to
make up the balance sheet of the banks.
It is worth asking why the banks did not try to make good with the collateral before
the crisis worsened. Among the main reasons, according to De la Cuadra and Valdés, there
were the absence of any control by banks, the sluggish and inefficient judicial system and
the relationship between banks and the so-called economic groups (the owners of the bank
would not try to liquidate collateral that also belonged to them).
By 1980 the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions ascertained that
independent auditing firms were not doing their job properly in rating the bank loans. There
were severe problems in terms of rating self-granted loans (i.e., loans to related firms). In
1980, a more transparent and efficient credit system began to be implemented. As a first
step, loans were rated in four categories (A, B, C and D)
3. In August 1981, the
Superintendency was vested with more power to control banks through an amendment to
the law that was intended to bring an end to self-granted lending. This empowered the
regulatory agency to obtain information from the banks on the 300 most important debtors
in the case of each institution (paid and unpaid loans). It also required banks to classify the
loans (consumer loans, mortgage loans, etc.). In 1982 the law incorporated a new category
which is riskier than former category B.
As from that date, the system to rate loans has been operating smoothly, and for the
first time the regulator spelled out rules with respect to loan loss reserves and past due
loans. As regards past due loans, at the end of the year, the loan loss reserve had to be
equivalent to 100 per cent of all loans which were past due during the first semester and 50
per cent of those that were past due during the second semester. The regulation kept a
general reserve of 0.75 per cent of the total amount of loans. However, economic groups
found ways to bypass the law (see De la Cuadra and Valdés).
All these efforts came too late to prevent the banking crisis. In 1983, following the
new risk rating, the authority liquidated three banks and intervened the administration of
                                                       
2 See Maquieira and Sierralta (1990).
3 Category A: Normal loans, not presenting any doubts regarding recoverability (principal and interests).
Category B: Loans below normal quality, because of weakness in the conditions under which they were
granted or granted under normal conditions but after all they had the worst performance. This does not mean
that they have a high likelihood to become bad debts.
Category C: Uncertain recovery, includes all loans granted under conditions which greatly depart from normal
conditions to  make a loan.
Category D: Defaulted loans, i.e., loans not repaid.13
five other banks. This situation took place in the middle of the deepest recession since the
thirties in Chile.
During 1983-1984 an intense debt rescheduling process was in place, and in which
the interest rate and term conditions for debtors were changed. The banks that were bailed
out were “re-privatized” during 1985-1986, through the so-called system of  popular
capitalism, whereby the ownership of the banks was sold to small stockholders who had
access to governmental credit under very special conditions.
A new institutional framework for banking in Chile was set up in 1986, when a new
banking law was enacted. This law was established along lines similar to the changes
introduced by the Superintendency in 1981. Some of the objectives of the new legal
framework were to prevent a new banking crisis and to provide more transparency to the
banking business
4. To accomplish this goal, the law required a more active role for the
Superintendency in rating banks’ risk, according to loan classification, a higher degree of
disclosure of information to the public and a strict restriction on banks’ business with
related parties.   In addition, the law established an active role for private risk rating
agencies and, as a complement, the Security Market Law set limits to “bank secrecy”
(Ramirez and  Rosende, 1992). Furthermore, the government restricted the insurance to
depositors, as a way of inducing depositors to seek more information on bank risk.
This new banking law included two important changes to protect creditor’s
interests. First, a bank cannot lend money under better conditions (period of grace, interest
rate and guarantees), compared to other individuals and firms, to parties that have any
direct or indirect relationship with the owners or with officials of the bank (insider trading).
Second, the bank is not allowed to grant a loan either directly or indirectly to any member
of the board of directors or any representative of the bank.
The expected results of all these changes were to improve the efficiency of the
banking system. As an outcome, the financial market developed very fast. A usual measure
of the depth of capital market is M2/GDP. Looking at the following figure, it is possible to
see that after the liberalization in place in 1975 this measure increased very fast from below
5 per cent to almost 25 per cent in 1981. Then it dropped until 1986 when it started
increasing again at a very fast rate, reaching 40 per cent of GDP.
                                                       
4See Ramírez and Rosende (1992) for a summary of the changes in the Chilean banking legislation.14
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The same conclusion can be reached when we look at total loans per capita. In 1975
the Chilean government liberalized the interest rate. This was the beginning of a free
financial market. The following figure shows the evolution of the log of total loans per
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The composition of banks’ ownership structure changed as a consequence of the
new environment. Foreign banks increased their importance in the banking system, while
only the State-owned bank lost importance. As it may be expected, finance companies also
increased their participation (see Table 3.2). In terms of ownership concentration, the main
5 banks (C5) concentrate 61 per cent of loans in 1986, which went down to 49.7 per cent in
1994 and increased to 62 per cent again in 1997, as a result of two large mergers in 1996.
The latter movement could be interpreted as an outcome of increased competition.
Table 3.2
Banking Sector Composition
(% of total amount of loans of banking sector)
Year Private National Banks Banco del Estado Foreign Banks. Finance Companies
1986 64% 22% 13% 1%
1990 60% 19% 19% 2%
1994 64% 16% 17% 3%
1997 62% 14% 21% 3%
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions
The banking disintermediation process, as pointed out by Fuentes and Basch (1998),
brought about a reduction in banks’ margin during the nineties.  This process is related to
the pension fund reform in 1981, the creation of leasing companies in 1986, the access to
foreign credit market, public debt issues and the more aggressive competition of
department stores in the nineties (see next section). The market share, measured trough
total amount of assets, of the banking sector
5 in the financial system went down from 91
per cent in 1986 to 66 per cent in 1997, considering mutual funds, pension funds, leasing
companies, insurance companies, stock brokers and investment funds among the agents in
the financial sector
To sum up, all this led to a more concentrated market. Banks also had to resort to
the retail market, i.e., households and small and medium-sized business lending. This
should probably increase the risk of bank portfolios, and therefore could lead to an increase
in non-performing loans. As we will see in the next section this has not been the case. As
we said, this is the second reason why the Chilean case is interesting.
3.3  Information sharing
Information sharing may be an important mechanism to mitigate both adverse selection and
moral hazard. According to Pagano and Jappelli (1993), information sharing can be used as
a prescreening element by the financial market, so as to partially solve the adverse selection
problem. This institutional arrangement is more likely to arise when borrowers are
heterogeneous, the credit market is large and the cost of sharing information is low.
                                                       
5  Department stores were excluded because the corresponding data was not available, but at present their
volume of intermediation is as large as that managed by leasing companies.16
On the other hand, information sharing reduces the moral hazard problem, since it
increases the borrower’s willingness to repay the loan. In this case, banks provide
incentives to the borrower to do his or her best effort to repay the loan since the debtor
knows that the bank is going to share default information with other lenders in the future,
and therefore reveal the borrower’s quality to the market. This mechanism ensures a lower
default rate and interest rate.
6
On the empirical side, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) find evidence that supports the
positive relationship between the existence and the quality of information sharing with the
ratio of total debt to GNP. With respect to default rates they found weak evidence that
information sharing is negatively associated with those rates. The data does not show that
larger size of consumer credit market statistically precede the creation of credit bureaus. At
this point Jappelli and Pagano state: “However, international comparisons fail to convey all
the information that can be gleaned from the detailed history of specific countries. The
historical evidence from the United States, Japan, Spain and Italy suggests that credit
bureaus tend to be created in the wake of consumer credit booms”.
Concerning the regulation on the information market in Chile, there are three main
principles that are to be abided by; banking secret, tax secret and statistical secret. The
information provided by banks can be released only to the banking system. The tax secret
prevents divulging information on companies’ revenues and households’ income. Finally,
the statistical secret protects demographic information relative to the family (age, sex,
religion, political affiliation, etc.).
Consistent with one of the conclusions obtained by Jappelli and Pagano in Chile the
main credit bureau (DICOM) began its operation in 1979. The Chilean Chamber of
Commerce (with a 50% stake in ownership) and a group of entrepreneurs set up this
bureau, at the suggestion of a group of international issuers of credit card who were
introducing this instrument in the Chilean financial market. Although the Chilean Chamber
of Commerce had a Commercial Bulletin that listed bad checks and overdue bills of
exchange, these international companies required more, better and updated information to
evaluate creditworthiness. In 1986 the Chilean Chamber of Commerce sold its ownership to
the rest of the group. In August 1994, Equifax bought 25 per cent of DICOM shares.
Subsequently, in December 1995 Equifax became the controller of DICOM with 50 per
cent of ownership, and in March 1997 Equifax became the owner of DICOM holding 100
per cent of the shares.
DICOM started with four products: information drawn from the Commercial
Bulletin (Chilean Chamber of Commerce), address verification, job verification and a
consolidated system of defaulted verification for credit issued by department stores (called
SICOM). At the beginning of the eighties, the Chilean Association of Banks called a public
tender to contract information services, which was awarded to DICOM. At the time this
firm provided the four products mentioned above, in addition to information on individuals
                                                       
6 See, for instance, Padilla and Pagano (1997).17
interdicted from opening checking accounts and information available from the Official
Bulletin.
7
In 1989 DICOM started signing individual contracts with each bank to provide
“white” and “black” information of debtors. This information was available (and still is)
only for the banking system, i.e., DICOM was processing information supplied by the
banks. In addition, department stores and the so-called Real Estate Mutual Funds only
provide “black” information to the system.
With respect to the banking system, banks and financial institutions are under the
obligation to provide information on individual customers (both households and
companies) to the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions. This information is
processed by the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions, so as to have
information on the total debt and the unpaid debt by each customer.
8 Subsequently, the
consolidated figures are returned to the banks and they know the total debt and the
outstanding debt in the banking system of any customer or prospective customer. They do
not have access to the information of who is (are) the creditor(s) of each economic agent.
The cost of processing the data for the banks was very high when the system began
to operate; important economies of scale derive from centralizing all information in only
one processing unit. Due to the development of the data processing industry, the cost of
processing the information by each bank itself has gone down. For this reason DICOM has
diversified both the information services provided and the portfolio of customers.
Among the main technological changes in this industry it is worth mentioning that
initially (1979) microfiches were used. By 1980 DICOM installed a computer main frame
and in 1984 it installed a network. Finally, the major change comes in 1991, with the
establishment of a computer-based system, which allows to give information directly from
DICOM to its connected client.
Related to this study, the main services provided by DICOM to its customers are:
a)  Data on the consolidated system of past due loans by individual and companies in the
banking system. This information is revised on a daily basis. This information is useful
in evaluating credit risk, opening current accounts, collection of overdue debts,
acceptance of bills of exchange, etc.
b)  Black information from Department Stores. These are reluctant to share white
information.
c)  Information on bad checks and overdue bills of exchange in the financial system,
published by the Chilean Chamber of Commerce in the Commercial Bulletin. It covers
the last five years. This information is revised on a weekly basis and it fulfills the same
purposes as the information in (a).
                                                       
7 Information in the Official Bullet includes company charters, names of partners, equity of companies,
bankruptcy filings, laws enacted and amended, etc.
8 It is important to notice that each individual and company is identified by a CUSIP (Individual Identification
Number) that is used to consolidate the information. In the case of individuals, this number also corresponds
to the Identification Card Number, Passport Number, diver’s license number and Social Security Number.18
d)  Information on people who are under an interdiction to open a current account and the
corresponding period for which it is in effect pursuant to instructions from the
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions.
e)  Name of individuals and companies who have defaulted payment of fines or who have
been prosecuted due to violations of International Trade and International Exchange
Laws. This information is updated periodically by the Chilean Central Bank. It is useful
for banks in determining credit facilities for international trade purposes.
f)  Statistics on the number of times that DICOM has been resorted to in order to obtain
information on an individual or company over the last three months. This is updated on
a daily basis. This information permits the detection of changes in the pattern of
leverage and contributes relevant information for evaluating credit risk (due to a higher
likelihood that the individual or the company is increasing the leverage).
g)  A record of new companies and amendments to charters and by-laws of existing
companies, list of individuals and companies who are or have been partners in a given
firm. This information helps to detect higher risk due to related business activities
between individuals and companies.
h)  Information on past due debts with state agencies.
i)  Records of people and firms who have filed a bankruptcy.
DICOM has a competitive advantage in processing information, mainly due to the
existence of economies of scale and of scope, and in spite of the cost reduction in the data
processing industry, banks still hire its services. This is consistent with theoretical
arguments that given the increasing returns to scale of information sharing it will bring
about a natural monopoly (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), which is seemingly the case of
DICOM. Actually, DICOM has a 67% share of the information market considering the
market in which it provides services. It is important to notice that there are about 60 smaller
companies in the market. Only considering the commercial reports, providing information
on creditworthiness, DICOM has a 75% of market share.
At present DICOM issues the equivalent of 1.4 million full credit reports per month
9
demanded by 20,000 clients. This company has grown between 15 per cent and 20 per cent
annually over the last 10 years measured in terms of report requirements. Its scope may
explain the low price of a full report, which is only US$ 0.40, as compared to the US (US$
1.5), Peru (US$ 2) and Argentina (US$ 3).
                                                       
9 DICOM receives 120 million calls, 67% of which are related to credit.19
3.4  Empirical analysis
This section develops an econometric exercise seeking to summarize the discussion
presented in this section. The analysis will consider the effects of institutional changes on
two variables: a measure of banking system development and the performing loans in the
banking system. First let’s look some statistics of the Chilean credit market.
3.4.1  The Chilean credit market: 1993-1997
This section will show some of the key statistics on capital market size and non-performing
loans for the formal Chilean credit market, by type of debtor and contract. Information on
those under the control of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions is easy
to obtain. Table 3.3 shows the stock of loans at the end of each year for the period 1993-
1997.
Table 3.3
Size of the Chilean Credit Market
(Millions US$)
Type of Loan 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Net Bank Loans 31,002 33,123 38,764 43,622 49,340
Growth rate (%) 13.0 6.8 17.0 12.5 13.1
Leasing Contracts 1,130 1,421 1,670 1,777 1,976
Growth rate (%) 47.7 25.7 17.6 6.4 11.2
Bonds 1,468 1,851 1,770 1,750 1,408
Growth rate (%) 24.6 26.1 -4.4 -1.1 -19.6
Credit cards 454 582 739 886 1,025
Growth rate (%) 31.7 28.1 26.9 19.9 15.7
Department Stores 204 427 664 880 1,165
Growth rate (%) NA 109.1 55.4 32.6 32.4
TOTAL 34,259 37,404 43,608 48,915 54,913
As % of GDP 62.4 64.5 68.0 71.0 74.5
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions, Superintendency of Securities and
Insurance and Chilean National Chamber of Commerce.
As Table 3.3 shows, the credit market has grown very quickly compared to the
economy as a whole, thus corroborating the M2/GDP trend shown in Figure 3.2 and per20
capital loans showed in Figure 3.3. While GDP increased by about 7.7% during 1993-1997,
the credit market grew by 12.5% over the same period. The bank loan is, by far, the most
important type of contract in the credit market. However, the type of contract, with the
highest growth rate, has been credit from Department Stores and Credit Cards. This is only
another evidence of banking disintermediation (Fuentes and Basch, 1998).
The fast growth of the credit card and Department Stores credit market reflects a
more general trend in consumer loan. From Table 3.4 it is possible to compare the fast
increase of consumer loans to the growth of all the other types of loans. The share of
consumer loans plus housing loans in total bank loans increased from 19% to 25.4%. This
type of loans shows a higher growth rate than corporate loans. The strong competition
within the financial system is the reason why banks have moved into new market segments,
such as the household credit market.
In Table 3.4 past due loans represent approximately 1 per cent of total loans.
According to the regulations of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions a
loan that has not been paid within 90 days after its maturity is classified as a past due loan.
This rule differs from the measure for loan loss reserves, that is useful in classifying the
risk of the bank portfolio, which are banks’ estimates of the default risk.
Table 3.4
Distribution of bank loans as a percentage of total loans
  (%)
Balance 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Corporate Loans 54.33 55.82 55.53 55.64 56.10
Consumer Loans 7.05 7.87 8.66 10.35 10.74
Housing 11.92 12.81 12.95 14.16 14.67
Foreign trade 19.14 15.85 15.09 12.39 10.51
Past dues 0.84 1.05 0.94 0.98 1.00
Credit line 3.13 3.36 3.53 3.59 3.58
Rescheduled 2.06 1.49 1.04 0.75 0.54
Other 1.53 1.74 2.25 2.14 2.86
Net Loans (millions US$) 31,002 33,123 38,764 43,622 49,340
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions
Table 3.5 shows non-performing loans for each type of contract. It is interesting to
note that past due loans as a percentage of total credit, is relatively low (about 2%). The
exception is the credit card contract, but if past dues are defined in terms of 30 days then
this ratio decreases very rapidly. In general, it can be stated that past due loans are small21
percentages of total credit. However, the performance of bank loans is much better than the
rest of the contracts. This situation could be attributed to the fact that banks offer several
products, and therefore if the customer does not pay any part of the loan on time, banks will
cancel all other contracts. Banks may also have better screening and monitoring
technologies as well as loan recovery technology.
Table 3.5
Non-performing loans as percentage of total credit
Type of Loans 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Past due loans (over 90 days) 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0
Leasing contracts (over 90 days) 6.0 4.0 3.4 2.9
Credit cards (1 to 90 days) NA NA 10.2 10.9 9.6
Credit cards (30 to 90 days) NA NA 2.3 2.6 2.9
Credit cards (60 to 90 days) NA NA 0.6 0.8 0.8
Department Stores 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.0
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions, Superintendency of Securities and
Insurance and Chilean National Chamber of Commerce.
3.4.2  Econometric analysis
The first question that we will explore is how the reforms of the seventies, the
changes in the legal framework and in the information sharing system affect the
development of the banking system. The idea is that the reforms of the seventies and the
incorporation of the information sharing system should have positively affected the
development of banking sector, while the 1986 banking law should have had an ambiguous
effect on the development of the sector. To test these hypotheses we built an annual
database of per capita banking loans (in real terms) from 1960 to 1997. A natural variable
to control for is the per capita GDP (see section 3.1); the hypothesis here is that the banking
system should be developing with the economy, on a long run perspective.
The first problem that we face in performing this analysis is that, in the case of Chile,
many changes were going on almost at the same time. As shown in section 3.2, there were
several reforms taking place in the seventies (financial liberalization, reserve requirements,
etc.) and in the eighties (new pension fund system, changes in banking law, the beginning
of information sharing, etc.). We attempt to sort out the effect of the most important
institutional innovations.
The variables included in the regression analysis were:
Log (per capita GDP): Log of per capita GDP expressed in pesos of 1986.22
Log (per capita loans): Log of per capita banking loans expressed in pesos of 1986.
Log (loans/GDP): Log of banking loans expressed in pesos of 1986 to real GDP.
D7597: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the period 1975-
1997, i.e., for the post-reforms period.
D8697: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the period 1986-
1997, i.e., for the period of a new banking law.
D8997: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the period 1989-
1997, i.e., for the period of information sharing among banks.
Some other structural changes were tested using dummy variables, but they were not
significant. For example, there was no evidence that per capita loans were affected by the
pension fund reform (1981-1997) or by information sharing that was in operation prior to
1989, when the private contract between DICOM and each bank in the financial system
started
10.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the regression. First of all, both per capita loans and
loans to GDP are strongly and positively correlated with per capita GDP. The reform of the
seventies had a positive impact on the development of the banking system, while Law No.
18,576 enacted in 1986 had a negative impact on the growth of per capita loan and
loan/GDP. There is certainly a structural change in 1986, but we could not ascertain
whether it affected the intercept or the slope coefficient. Both were significant, but if you
include a dummy for the intercept and the slope simultaneously become non-significant.
There is something interesting about information sharing. As described in section 3.3,
since 1979 DICOM started gathering public information and providing it to the market. But
the beginning of private contracts between DICOM and the banks took place only in 1989.
We checked for structural changes in 1979 but they do not appear to be statistically
significant. On the other hand, the structural change of 1989 affected both the intercept and
the slope coefficient in different directions. Per capita loans become less sensitive to the
growth rate of the economy, but at the same time there had a once-and-for-all increase in
the function by 1989 that can interpret as the effect of the improvement in the information
sharing system.
                                                       
10 It should be borne in mind that some information sharing started in 1979, but it was public information that
DICOM pooled. This information did not include the indebtedness with the financial system.23
Table 3.6
Development of the banking sector
(Least square)
Variable Log (per capita loan) Log (per capita loan) Log (loan/GDP) Log (loan/GDP)
Constant -6.650 -6.657 -5.301 -5.309
(-3.615) (-3.616) (-2.837) (-2.838)
Log (per capita GDP) 1.372 1.373 0.888 0.889
(3.899) (3.899) (2.674) (2.675)
Log (per capita loan)_1 0.745 0.744
(14.331) (14.330)
Log (loan/GDP)_1 0.786 0.786
(14.697) (14.689)
D7597 0.307 0.307 0.271 0.271
(3.554) (3.557) (3.198) (3.200)
D8697 -0.135 -0.159
(-3.563) (-3.653)
D8697*Log (per capita GDP) -0.024 -0.028
(-3.565) (-3.657)
D8997 4.484 4.355 3.248 3.097
(2.386) (2.354) (1.715) (1.660)
D8997*Log (per capita GDP) -0.800 -0.778 -0.583 -0.557
(-2.429) (-2.398) (-1.754) (-1.700)
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.980 0.980
S.E. of regression 0.124 0.124 0.130 0.130
Log likelihood 28.482 28.486 26.967 26.969
Durbin-Watson 2.201 2.200 2.178 2.177
t ratio in parenthesis. The estimation procedures was OLS correcting the variance covariance matrix by the
Newey-West HAC procedure.
Considering the literature on growth and financial development, one can be
suspicious of the results in terms that pre capita GDP is endogenous and jointly determined
with any of the proxies for credit market development. Therefore we proceed to estimate
using instrumental variables using one lag of per capita GDP. As it can be seen in Table 3.7
the results do not change very much and the same conclusions can be derived.24
Table 3.7
Development of the banking sector
(Instrumental variables)
Variable Log (per capita loan) Log (per capita loan) Log (loan/GDP) Log (loan/GDP)
Constant -6.692 -6.701 -8.427 -8.439
(-2.458) (-2.460) (-2.549) (-2.550)
Log (per capita GDP) 1.380 1.382 1.427 1.429
(2.650) (2.652) (2.444) (2.445)
Log (per capita loan)_1 0.744 0.743
(13.459) (13.462)
Log (loan/GDP)_1 0.721 0.721
(9.887) (9.881)
D7597 0.308 0.308 0.334 0.334
(4.695) (4.702) (3.571) (3.572)
D8697 -0.135 -0.197
(-2.833) (-2.793)
D8697*Log (per capita GDP) -0.024 -0.035
(-2.828) (-2.794)
D8997 4.523 4.396 6.227 6.042
(1.641) (1.619) (1.899) (1.874)
D8997*Log (per capita GDP) -0.807 -0.784 -1.109 -1.076
(-1.667) (-1.645) (-1.921) (-1.897)
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.978 0.978
S.E. of regression 0.124 0.124 0.135 0.135
Durbin-Watson 2.198 2.200 1.943 1.941
t ratio in parenthesis. The estimation procedures was TSLS correcting the variance covariance matrix by the
Newey-West HAC procedure.
The following table shows the long-term elasticity of capital market development
respect to per capita GDP. As it can be seen this elasticity decreases dramatically after
1989.
Table 3.8
Long-term elasticity of per capita loan and
Loan/GDP ratio respect to per capita GDP
Dependent Variable 1960-1985 1986-1988 1989-1997
log per capita loan 5.3774 5.2840 2.2335
log (loan/GDP) 5.1219 4.9964 1.139825
The second objective was to identify the determinants of aggregate overdue loans as a
share of total loans. Unfortunately we do not have a long yearly series, but we were able to
build a monthly series of overdue loans from January 1986 to December 1997 (see Figure
3.4). An alternative to a measure of unpaid debt is loan losses computed by the banks.
However, we believe that the former measure is a better proxy to unpaid debt. In any case,
both measures have decreased over time, as shown in Figure 3.4. Important regulatory
improvements and the strong growth of the economy may explain this fact, after the
financial crisis during the first half of the eighties.
Figure 3.4


























Past Due Loans  (% Effective Loans) Loan Losses  (% Effective Loans)
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions
We regress the overdue loans to total loans ratio on macroeconomic variables and
seasonal dummies. It is important to remember that banks have 90 days to consider an
unpaid loan as past due in their balance sheets. Therefore we had to include the
macroeconomic variables that capture the cycle but with a lag of four months. The four
candidates to explain short-term economic situation are the interest rate (we used loan rate26
of interest), IMACEC
11, an index of economic activity constructed monthly by the Central
Bank, inflation rate and the standard deviation of inflation rate.
Then we looked for structural changes that could be explained by the effect of
information sharing. At the time there was some information sharing in the system and by
August 1986 the authority enacted the new law. Therefore, major changes did not appear
except for the private arrangements between DICOM and the banks to share private
information on debtors. As we saw in the previous exercise, these agreements started in
1989, but we did not know their exact date and when it began to be effective. Therefore, we
start verifying structural changes in January 1990, and then we went back month by month
through 1989 searching for a structural change. This seems to have been in place in October
1989
12.
In summary the variables used for the analysis were the following:
LPDUEPR: Past dues to total loans ratio for the private banking system
Interest: Loan interest rate
Yearly %DIMACEC: Percentage change in economic activity measured by the
IMACEC indicator
DINFO: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 from October 1989 to
December 1997.
Table 3.9 shows the regression results for this exercise. In the first column we have
the regression of past due loans as a proportion of total loans for private banks on interest
rate, 12 months variation of the IMACEC, rate of interest, lag values of the dependent
variables and the seasonal dummies (coefficients not reported, but all of them were
statistically significant). As can be seen, the interest rate positively affects past due loans,
i.e., an increase in this independent variable will bring about a higher proportion of past
dues over total loans. On the other hand, a drop in the economic activity will generate a
higher share of past dues.  However, this coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
The second column of Table 3.9 shows the results when introducing the dummy
variable DINFO. First we observed that starting October 1989, there are changes in both the
intercept and the slope coefficient. There is a reduction, ceteris paribus, of past dues loans
after that date. But also the sensitivity of past dues with respect to the per capita loan
decreases. The coefficient of the interest rate diminishes from 0.095 to 0.027, comparing
before and after October 1989. On the other hand, for the same period, the impact of
economic activity decreases (in absolute value) from 0.0072 down to 0.016. Neither
average nor standard deviation of the inflation rate is statistically significant in any of the
regressions.
                                                       
11 IMACEC: Monthly Index of Economic Activity, available as from January 1986.
12 The Chow test for this month has the lowest p-value, which is consistent with the inclusion of our dummy
variable (DINFO).27
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S.E. of regression 0.0008 0.0007
Log likelihood 739.2267 751.8486
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.8781 1.9392
Number of observations 128 128
t ratio in parenthesis. The estimation procedures was OLS correcting the variance covariance
matrix by the Newey-West HAC procedure.
We also computed long-run coefficients, which show that an increase in the interest
rate of 100 base points will have the same impact of a drop of the economic activity in 3.7
per cent. It seems that past dues are more closely related to interest rate than to economic
activity. Table 3.10 shows the long-term coefficients.28
Table 3.10
Long-term coefficients
Variables 01.86 to 09.89 09.89 to 12.97
Interest-4 1.4808 0.4131
Yearly %DIMACEC-4 -0.1119 -0.0253
4  Other determinants of loan repayment: Stylized facts
This section analyzes those determinants of loan repayments that cannot be included
in the regression analysis. Specifically we will discuss the role of access to credit, legal
framework and private solutions. In terms of private solutions we will consider
prescreening techniques, collection technology and private contracts.
4.1  Access to credit
Another important feature to assess the performance of the financial market is the access to
credit, which is usually mentioned as problematic in developing countries. One may argue
that the good performance of the Chilean credit market is due to a reduced access to credit
by small firms and households. As shown in Section 3, this seems not to be the case in
Chile, as the credit market has been growing at a very fast rate (under any measure that you
may consider M2/GDP, Total Loans/GDP, etc.), particularly in the case of consumer loans.
To a certain extent, the development of the household credit market has been able to
rely on a more intense use of collateral than for company lending united to the lower risk of
default of collateralized loans to households compared to firms. This is witnessed by survey
data that we collected from banks during 1998, asking for information on several variables
as of December 1997. We only obtained nine responses out of 28 banks operating in 1997.
Due to their size and the type of market in which they operate, these banks may be
representative of the structure of the Chilean banking system. Both large and small private
banks made up this group of banks, both foreign and domestic.
Using data drawn from the survey, figure 4.1 shows the percentage of total loans
covered by collateral and other guarantees, grouped by households and firms. Comparing
secured loans (collateral plus other guarantees) between firms and households, the latter
group shows a higher proportion than the former. This may be explained by the use of the
funds. In the case of households, some of the loans are used for consumption (Townsend,
1995), which do not generate cash flows. On the other hand, most loans to firms will be
used for investment purposes and consequently they will produce cash flow to pay back.29
Figure 4.1
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Source: Bank Survey.
Figure 4.2 shows that, for households, collateralized loans have been far less risky than
unsecured loans and than collateralized loans to firms. It may appear puzzling instead that,
in the case of companies, the default rate is lower for uncollateralized loans than
collateralized ones, in contrast with what happens for households. This may be explained
with a sample selection effect: for firms, banks ask for collateral mainly from the highest
risk companies, so that ex post one observes a higher proportion of defaults for
collateralized loans.30
Figure 4.2












Collateralized Other Guarantees Unsecured
Households Firms
Source: Bank Survey. This figure shows the percentage of unpaid loans of total loans approved for that
type of contract.
These figures do not imply that banks may have a higher level of loan losses, since
the information gathered through interviews with normalization departments stated that
over 90 per cent of secured past due company loans are recovered, which does not hold in
the other case (see Section 4.2 below).
On the other hand, the rapid expansion of credits from Department Stores along with
the ease to obtain credit from them, allows us to state that there are not many limitations to
credit.
4.2  Legal framework
As described in Section 2, Chile has a French Civil Law framework. The main
characteristic of this legal structure is that laws, rather than judicial precedent, determines
the rules which apply to economic transactions. In fact, there are laws that regulate creditor
rights, e.g., Law No. 18,010 of 1981 that governs credit transactions in terms of conditions
of the loan, interest payments and type of currency. Additionally, any business transaction
is also regulated by general rules established in the Code of Commerce in the Civil Code.31
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) conclude that Civil laws give weaker rights to creditors
than Common laws do. For this reason, a less developed financial market is expected in
Civil Law countries. What makes Chile different is that the financial market has undergone
a major change since the beginning of the eighties, which has gone hand in hand with the
modernization of the legal framework and the passing of new laws (See Section 3).
However, not only the law matters, but also its enforcement. This section shows that the
solution provided by the Chilean judicial system is inefficient. We hypothesize that this is
due to the high cost and low likelihood of obtaining an effective result.
Another determinant of the willingness to pay is punishment. As an example we have
difference of the treatment to bad checks and to overdue bills of exchange. The latter are a
type of promissory note where an agent recognizes a debt with somebody else, e.g., firms
sign this type of note with suppliers. The payment of a check is easier to collect, since the
debtor could go to prison, which is not the case for bills of exchange. This explains why,
among the figures for bad checks and those for bills of exchange (Table 4.1), the latter are




Bad Checks and Overdue Bills of Exchange
Bad Checks Bills of Exchange
Year Share of Number of Bills of
Exchange
Share of Total Value % of Number of
Checks
% of Total Value
of Checks
% Not paid % In litigation % Not paid % In litigation
1986 0.37 0.22 7.17 5.50 5.47 2.37
1987 0.41 0.23 8.81 6.78 6.66 2.68
1988 0.36 0.23 8.56 6.21 4.42 2.55
1989 0.43 0.26 8.45 5.99 5.57 3.15
1990 0.41 0.26 9.29 6.66 5.68 3.8
1991 0.35 0.23 9.85 8.26 5.46 2.19
1992 0.39 0.26 10.08 6.17 6.31 2.97
1993 0.43 0.37 8.38 7.58 9.54 4.47
1994 0.41 0.20 8.30 7.82 7.62 5.56
1995 0.38 0.17 8.60 7.15 9.07 3.86
1996 0.43 0.22 10.62 7.34 11.88 4.34
1997 0.54 0.27 9.16 9.6 9.4 6.22
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions
Also in this section we show the effect of the changes in the bankruptcy code in
place in 1982, under the operation of Law No.  18,175, to evaluate if the objectives of the
                                                       
13 As regards the difference mentioned above between checks and bills of exchange, there is a new credit
instrument, which is the post-dated check that is widely accepted by department stores. A customer with a
checking account can pay for his or her purchase with three such checks. This type of credit is not included in
the statistics on the size of the financial market.32
law were accomplished. The idea is to ascertain whether the new framework did improve
the efficiency of the system. We also analyze whether the law protects creditor (some or all
of them) or debtor rights.
4.2.1  Judicial system
In the section on international comparisons we showed Chile’s performance in terms of the
efficiency of the judicial system as compared to other groups of countries. As a summary
we can say here that Chile performs above the average of the group of French Civil Law
countries but below the average of the whole sample (Table 2.1). The performance is even
worse if we compare it with the average of the other groups. It is important to notice that La
Porta et al.’s information is based on the assessment that foreign investors made about
doing business in the country. In this section we include statistics on the efficiency of the
judicial system to gain a better understanding of the Chilean case.
The next table shows statistics on lawsuits filed and ruled during the period 1993-
1996. It was possible to develop a flow of cases from the Department of Statistics of the
Court of Appeals. Executory lawsuits include all types of lawsuits where a payment
agreement was involved. For example, they include a lawsuit for unpaid loans and also for
car accidents. It was not possible to distinguish between the different type of cases, but the
figures still provide a perception of how well the judicial system operates.
Table 4.2
Flow of lawsuits classified by type of litigation
(%)
Type of Litigation 1993 1994 1995 1996
Filed Ruled Filed Ruled Filed Ruled Filed Ruled
Bad check notification
litigation
32.5 38.0 30.7 34.4 28.0 35.8 25.8 33.5
Notification of overdue Bill
of Exchange litigation
  9.9 11.6   5.9   7.6   5.4   7.4 4.2   5.9
Bankruptcy   0.1   0.2   0.1   0.2   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1
Executory lawsuits 57.5 50.2 63.3 57.8 66.5 56.7 69.9 60.5
Total 175,679 126,816 236,909 154,747 233,104 187,749 259,069 216,366
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) and Department of Statistics, Court of Appeals. Data on stock
and length of lawsuits developed by authors.
Lawsuits ruled in any given year are less than the lawsuits filed during that same
year, with the exception of bankruptcy cases. We cannot say much about the length of the
trial as the Court of Appeals does not have any information on that. However, we compute33
the stock of lawsuits for 1995
14, and then divide it at the beginning of each year by the
lawsuits ruled during that year.  As can be seen in Table 4.3 this estimated length of
lawsuits varies from one and a half to two years
15.
Table 4.3
Length of lawsuits 1990-1996
Year Lawsuits filed Lawsuits ruled Stock of Lawsuits




1990 128,494 117831 205,656 1.95
1991 127,380 105625 227,411 2.10
1992 123,026 108,233 242,204 1.91
1993 175,679 126,816 291,067 1.88
1994 236,909 154,747 373,229 1.99
1995 233,104 187,749 418,584 1.93
1996 259,069 216,366 461,287
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) and Department of Statistics, Court of Appeals.
Data on stock and length of lawsuits developed by authors.
Another item of information provided by banking sector executives is that only 20
per cent of unpaid loans are taken to court, because most of them are settled through private
arrangements. In fact, banks prefer to negotiate a private agreement with the debtor for a
period of up to four months rather than filing a lawsuit. When a lawsuit is filed, the cost of
attorneys is about ten per cent of the amount recovered. Considering the direct cost and the
time to recover a payment through the judicial system, in addition to the many more
favorable alternatives in order to recover a higher present value of unpaid loans through a
negotiation process, banks have all the incentives not to take legal action.
Here, we can conclude that the judicial system cannot explain why we observe a
low level of arrears in the banking system. This is consistent with the idea that French Civil
Law countries have less efficient judicial systems and hence offer less protection to
creditors. It should be noted that a French Civil Law system is less flexible as compared to
a Common Law one, since the former establishes general rules while the latter provides
more alternative of solutions. This is mainly due to the fact that Common Law operates on
a case by case basis.
4.2.2  Bankruptcy code
The current bankruptcy code is stipulated in Law No. 18,175 enacted in 1982, to replace
Law No. 4,558 which dates since 1925. The new law includes two important changes that
may accelerate bankruptcy proceedings. First, bankruptcy receivers are private agents
                                                       
14 For 1995, we were able to obtain the lawsuits that may be classified as debt litigation, by applying the
average share of this item to total lawsuits filed during 1990-1996.
15 This confirms the information obtained from the interviews to banking sector executives.34
designated by the creditors and under State supervision through the National Bankruptcy
Receivership (Fiscalía Nacional de Quiebras, FNQ) which is responsible for overseeing
their actions. Second, the law provides for a deposit of U.F. 100 (approximately US $
3,117)
16 whenever anybody files a bankruptcy petition against another party. In the
previous code, no cost was involved and many bankrupt companies and individuals had no
assets. If we compare the length of the bankruptcy proceedings, by only taking into account
those that had assets, we find that under the code in force they are much faster than what
they used to be.
The following table compares the length of bankruptcy proceedings under the
different codes.
Table 4.4
Length of Bankruptcy Proceedings
Code Number of
bankruptcies
Period of Time Mean duration Standard deviation
4,558 1,218 1929-1983 4 years and 10
months
4 years and 11
months
18,175 887 1983-1996 3 years and 1
month
2 years and 5 months
Source: National Bankruptcy Receivership, Bulletin No.54
The means are different at the 1- per cent level of significance. It can be stated that
the standing bankruptcy code did improve the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings, by
taking this measure of efficiency. Moreover, the variance of the length has decreased
considerably, making the length of the procedure more predictable.
An important economic implication of a bankruptcy code is to determine how the law
protects the debtor’s versus creditor’s interests. In this sense the National Bankruptcy
Receivership classifies bankruptcies into three categories based on their causes - fortuitous,
guilty, and fraudulent. The first type is in place when something unexpected happens, such
as a natural disaster. In the second case, the debtor is negligent in managing the firm.
Finally, the last type occurs when the debtor has acted in an illegal manner.
The debtor must file a bankruptcy petition within the next days following its failure
to pay a liability. He must submit all required financial statements, identifying his creditors,
the amount of debt outstanding with each one, a list of his assets and a report clearly
explaining the reasons for the company’s bad performance.
The creditors` committee designates the bankruptcy receiver, whose first action is to
collect all accounting books, documents, records and assets of the debtor in order to
compile a list of the assets, with an indication of their condition. This is normally
accomplished in less than seven days (86 per cent of the cases).
17 The receiver is
responsible for the firm’s management while its assets are sold, and also has to collect any
                                                       
16See Article 44 of Law No. 18,175.
17 Source: National Bankruptcy Receivership,35
notes and accounts receivable outstanding and, finally, he must sell the assets and make a
settlement with the creditors.
The receiver must privilege the payment of first class debts
18, which have not been
objected to in the judicial process. A second class debt includes those guaranteed with
assets. The next type of debts is mortgages and the last one is the remainder of debt with no
guarantees. These are paid proportionally to the amount of the debt.
According to Article 102, everyone who has been acknowledged as a creditor by the
bankruptcy receiver will have voting rights in the creditors committee to determine the
future of the bankrupt firm
19. In this sense, Chilean standing law does not assign any
special role to secured creditors as in the case of the UK code and Chapter 11 in the US
20.
Under the current Chilean code, creditors can agree on either the continuation of the
operation of the company
21 or liquidate its assets.
22 In the case of the first decision, the law
requires at least 67 per cent of majority of the creditors and for the second one at least 50
per cent. In the UK secured creditors can liquidate the firm even if it is worth more as a
going concern to all creditors. In Germany all creditors vote. For the liquidation decision, in
the UK the bankruptcy receiver has complete control of the firm and does not require the
approval of the creditors to sell the company’s assets. In Germany, there is no haste in
selling the firm’s assets. According to Franks et al. in this case the bankruptcy receiver has
great powers to take his time in selling the insolvent firm (the average time is 27.5 months).
Briefly stated, the bankruptcy code in Chile accelerates bankruptcy proceedings as
compared to developed countries, as it imposes time limits for asset liquidation which are
lower than a year. Another important feature is that all the creditors have the right to vote,
which prevents possible redistribution of wealth from unsecured creditors to secured
creditors, as in the case of the UK and the US. It should be noted that the new German code
(enacted in 1994 and to become effective in 1999) gives the same voting rights to all
creditors (as in the case of Chile), but the time required for liquidation is still much longer.
The debtor, as any other agent in the economy, can file a petition for bankruptcy. In
Chile, during the period 1982-1994, financial institutions were the most frequent creditors
filing petitions for bankruptcy (38.9 per cent of the cases) followed by the debtors
themselves (34.9 per cent).
23 These figures make sense: financial institutions are in a
position to provide resources to the companies to continue in business and debtors must
avoid being classified as guilty or fraudulent in bankruptcy.
                                                       
18 First class debts are as follows: judicial expenses incurred, expenses generated from managing the
bankruptcy, expenses incurred due to illness and /or death of debtor, employees salaries, social security
contributions not paid by the debtor to the Pension Fund, legal compensations for workers, taxes and
withholding tax claims. In general, the priorities in descending order are as follow: direct cost associated to
the bankruptcy, debtor illness and death, debts with workers and tax debts.
19 The law requires that at least two of them should attend meeting of creditors committee and that they
should represent no less than 25 per cent of the debts entitled to vote.
20 For a more detailed discussion see Franks, Nyborg and Thorous (1996).
21 The firm can continue in operation (either partially or totally) at the most for two years.
22 This must be done within the next six months and if there is any land and buildings (real property), the law
allows nine months at the most.
23 Source: National Bankruptcy Receivership.36
Another factor to determine the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings is the amount
of direct cost. In international literature, Warner (1977) computes the direct bankruptcy cost
for a sample of American railroad companies and finds it to be irrelevant from an economic
viewpoint. Actually, he finds it to be, on average, one per cent of the market value of the
firm prior to bankruptcy. However, he recognizes that bankruptcy costs should be higher
since he is not taking indirect costs into account. Another problem underlying this
estimation is that regulated firms such as those studied by Warner have lower bankruptcy
costs. Altman (1984) is one of the first authors that tries to measure the indirect bankruptcy
cost for a sample of 19 firms in different industries and he finds that these costs are
between 8.1 per cent and 10.5 per cent of the market value of the firm prior to bankruptcy.
It can even be as high as 17.5 per cent of the market value of the firm one-year prior to the
bankruptcy. Furthermore the direct bankruptcy costs varies from 2 to 4 per cent of the
market value of the firm, prior to bankruptcy.
With respect to bankruptcy costs for Chile, Maquieira (1993) tries to estimate direct
and indirect bankruptcy costs. In order to compute the direct bankruptcy cost, the initial
sample consisted of 1207 companies that went bankrupt during the period 1983-1992, and
he finds that the direct cost increases over this time interval. Therefore, to be more realistic
he computes the direct cost for the sample of firms that went bankrupt in 1992 (73 firms).
He performs a regression analysis between the liquidation value of the firms and the direct
costs and he finds that the direct cost is basically a variable cost and it is approximately
9.5% of the liquidation value of the assets.
Unfortunately, most of these firms were not listed on the stock exchange, which made
it difficult to compare the results with those obtained by  Altman. However, taking the
sample that traded its stocks (only 7 firms) he finds that the liquidation value of the assets is
approximately 17.5 per cent of the market value. He then concludes that the direct cost is
1.7 per cent of the market value of the firm. On the other hand, and following a similar
methodology to the one used by Altman with this small sample, the author finds that the
indirect bankruptcy costs represents, on average, a 14.5 per cent of the market value of the
firm one year before the bankruptcy. This result suggests that total bankruptcy costs-direct
plus indirect- in Chile are on average higher than in U.S.A., and that, though relatively fast,
the bankruptcy procedure is sufficiently expensive to considerably reduce the probability of
repayment of the creditors filing for bankruptcy.
4.3  Private solutions
4.3.1  Prescreening technique
Banks apply different prescreening procedures to companies and households. With respect
to the first group, due to the nature of corporate loans, banks do not apply the scoring
techniques to be discussed in the next section. In this case banks work on a case-by-case37
basis. There are different variables that banks analyze in order to allocate a credit. The
specific weight of each variable in the decision process depends on each bank’s policy.
These variables are:
a)  the track record of past performance with the bank and the financial system as revealed
by DICOM’s information;
b)  the economic sector of the company: some banks do not lend money to firms involved
in certain industries;
c)  the capacity to generate cash flows to meet financial costs;
d)  the ownership structure: if the owners have good business references, even if the firm
does not show a good cash flow generation, banks are willing to make loans.
24However,
some banks do not assign much weight to this variable, as owners could well allow the
firm to go bankrupt or simply sell the firm;
e)  the track record of bad checks or bills of exchange that have been under litigation;
f)  the company’s leverage and liquidity.
g)  the trend of sales trend;
h)  the losses reported in the recent past;
i)  the firm’s working capital requirements.
The functional level at which the decision is made within banks depends on the amount
of credit requested and on the existence of collateral. That is, a bank executive makes small
credit decisions, while the board of directors of the bank is responsible for the decision on
credit applications involving higher amounts. Thus, the requirement of collateral is an
important characteristic of the loan contract so as to increase the probability of repayment.
In the household market, consumer loans can be obtained from banks, finance
companies
25 and department stores. Banks are mainly concentrated in the higher income
household segment compared to finance companies, while department stores on average
cater to even lower income households. Given that each group has different risk, the
interest rate reflects it, which allows segmentation of the consumption credit market.
Actually, since consumption credit is a type of retail credit, finance companies and
retail banks use a statistical technique, called credit scoring, to discriminate between high
and low quality borrowers. Among the variables included in the statistical analysis are: a)
historical and current indebtedness with the financial system, b) number of arrears, c)
commercial track record (checks and bills of exchange under litigation), d) past
performance with the finance company, e) past performance with credit cards f) job
situation (economic activity, net income, job tenure, etc.) g) demographic variables. This
technique, it is not widely spread among banks, because of the nature of their customers
26.
                                                       
24 As Avery, Bostic and Samolyck (1998) show in the case of small business companies in the US economy,
personal assets serve as a substitute for business collateral at the time when banks approve lines of credit. On
the other hand, personal guarantees appear not to be substitutes of personal collateral.
25 By finance companies are meant those institutions which by law are not allowed to issue current accounts.
They receive money from banks as depositors, and they lend to individuals for consumption purposes.
26 DICOM also provides the calculation of a credit score that could be used by banks either directly or an
input to their own models. DICOM’s score may not consider some important characteristics proper to the
bank’s specific customer.38
We obtained a data set of 38,281 consumer loans, granted during June through
August 1997, for which credit scoring was applied. Among these 14,507 (37.9%) were
rejected by the scoring system, but applicants received the credit anyhow. This data set
provides a good opportunity to examine the ex post efficiency of the technique as the same
credits were observed one year later. Some of them were outstanding and others were past
due. In the following table we show the percentage of accepted loans that were accepted by
the scoring technique and one year later were either outstanding or past due. The table also
shows the loans granted, but rejected by the credit scoring that were outstanding and past
due after 30, 60 and 90 days. This table allows to compute unconditional probabilities, e.g.,
the probability that a credit is outstanding given that the credit scoring rejected it (Type I
error)
27.
Note that out of 14,507 loans, between 86 and 96 per cent are outstanding loans
depending on the definition of non-performing loans (if the loan is unpaid 30, 60 or 90 days
after the due date). Also if we allow for more time to normalize an unpaid situation the
Type I error increases from 73.3 to 91.1 per cent. Table 4.7 below provides the finance
company with information as to whether it should relax its credit policy or not depending
on the loss function that they want to minimize. Here we can calculate the expected loss of
a bad decision, which will depend on the weight that the firm allocates to each type of
error. According to the result if we accept the actual criteria to reject a credit, the finance
company would have rejected between 10 to 13 thousand loans (depending again on the
time period considered) that ultimately were outstanding.
Table 4.7




Scoring Accepted 93.96   6.04 62.10
Results Rejected 73.28 26.72 37.90




Scoring Accepted 96.98   3.02 62.10
Results Rejected 83.62 16.38 37.90




Scoring Accepted 98.47 1.53 62.10
Results Rejected 91.09 8.91 37.90
Total 95.67 4.33 100.00
                                                       
27 Type II error will be the probability that a credit is past due given that it was accepted by the credit scoring.39
The cutoff policy established by the bank appears to be “too tough”. For instance,
Table 4.7 shows that among rejected loans only 8.9% were 90 days overdue. However, we
do not know how many outstanding loans were repaid at maturity. The bank could change
the policy for rejecting credit applications so as to induce a higher rate of acceptance. This
will reduce Type I error but will increase Type II error. If the company wants to minimize
Type II error it will never reduce the cut-off point.
4.3.2  Collection technology
The technology to collect past due loans depends on the type of contracts, issuer and
debtor. In other words, the type of contract and debtor define the strategy that a bank will
follow. Thus, they could either outsource the collection service (mainly in the case of
consumer loans and large household loans) or resort to using an internal office called
Department of Normalization (mainly in the case of firms).
By law, banks cannot make any profit from the collection activity. However, banks
are allowed to charge interest on past due loans. For some types of contracts they use
external collection agencies. The need to develop a collection technology derives from the
fact that banks have become concentrated in the consumer loan market, as an outcome of
the disintermediation process (see Section 3.2). Both the volumes of loans in this market
and the fact that banks cannot profit from collection activities have led to the development
of a collection industry. If a debtor’s loan is past due, the bank will charge past due interest
rate and the collection agency will charge a collection fee. The banks’ owners control some
of these collection agencies, while others are independent.
In the case of households credit market the collection technology is very important.
The collection activity usually starts on the fifth day after the due date of a payment in the
case of credit cards, around 15 days in the case of consumer loans and 45 days in the case
of mortgage loans. To do so, banks, finance companies and department stores operate with
collection agencies before taking the case to court. There seems to be a positive correlation
between the existence of (and the type of) collateral and the time that the financial
institution takes to start collection activities.
The main support for the collection action has been the technological improvement of
the telecommunications sector. The liberalization of the telecommunications industry (at
the end of the eighties) triggered the change in the collection technology. The cost of using
the phone has decreased dramatically over the last ten years, which along with a downward
trend in the cost of computer-based activities have created a new scenario for this activity.
The creditor begins the collection activity by sending to the collecting agency a
periodic list of loans past due. Then the collecting agency proceeds to obtain payment.
The most advanced way of collection technology consists in an electronic device
that consolidates, integrates and evaluates all the information in a single database. This
device ranks the information based on the likelihood of recovery through payment. This40
step accomplishes two objectives simultaneously: a more efficient use of resources and a
more effective collection.
The electronic device integrates the database provided by the debtor with a CTI
(Computer Telephone Integration) system. This handles both exit and entry phone calls.
The exit phone calls are made by a calling predictive system, which recognizes if there is a
person responding at the other end of the line, if there is an answering machine or if there is
no answer at all. Based on the probability of getting an answer, the system makes several
simultaneous calls. When finally an answer is obtained, the machine passes the call and the
debtor’s information (on the computer’s screen) to an operator on hand and it disconnects
all other calls. The operator invites the debtor to regularize the credit situation or leaves a
message if the debtor is not available. Actually, in an even more sophisticated system, the
computer will display on the screen what the operator should communicate to the person at
the other end of the line.
The messages left by the operators will generate future entry phone calls to the
system, which are received by the IVR (Intelligent Voice Response) system if no operator
is available. Otherwise, the phone call goes through the ACD (Automatic Calling
Distributors) device, which communicates the debtor while it displays all the debtor
information on the operator’s computer screen.
The technology described is the most capital-intensive one. It is possible to dispense
with some of the devices used by this technology, and thus move forwards as more labor-
intensive technology in collecting unpaid debt. In fact, the whole process could be managed
in a very rudimentary way, where the database provided by the creditor is given directly to
the operator who starts calling without any specific order. The most labor-intensive
technology lacks a CTI system. Because the database is not consolidated through any
computer system, sometimes there is duplication of collection actions. For instance, an
operator is trying to locate a debtor while at the same time a collector from the same agency
is making a call at the debtor’s home.  This type of inefficiency involves higher costs, but it
requires less fixed investment.
There is another interesting feature of household credit collection, which is used by
the department stores. When they want to collect an unpaid loan, they simultaneously send
the information to a collection agency and to DICOM. The latter action is one of the most
effective mechanisms to collect the payment, since department stores’ debtors do not have
good access to the credit market and, therefore, have to clear their situation with the
creditor as soon as possible.
In the case of a firm, when a loan is past due, the bank, at first, tries to negotiate an
agreement with the debtor. In other words, the bank resorts to different methods to collect
the payment, which usually implies changing the conditions of the loan. Some of the
elements that are present in this type of negotiation are: a) re-scheduling the terms of the
loan, b) introducing new collateral c) reducing the interest rate, d) refinancing the debt41
based on a partial cash payment at the time of rescheduling, e) liquidating guarantees
28, f)
financing a new project
29.
When all the possibilities of negotiation have failed or the debtor is dishonest, the
case is sent to the bank’s Legal Department to initiate legal actions. The success of these
actions depends on the existence of collateral and the type of guarantees. When there is no
collateral, the bank’s collection depends basically on the debtor’s willingness to repay. The
lawsuit regularly lasts between one and a half and two years.
On the other hand, if collateral exists, the recovery of a loan depends on the type of
guarantee. In fact the establishment of collateral could be a mortgage in the case of real
estate, or a pledge in the case of equipment. To liquidate the collateral, at first, the bank
needs to take the debtor to the court. When the court rules and the debtor is notified, then
the bank can auction the asset.
The first possible legal action is called executory action and the second one ordinary
procedure. The former relates to the collection of the promissory note. This is valid for one
year. After that it takes place the ordinary procedure which can take years.
As can be seen, there are several reasons why borrowing firms have incentives to
repay the debt: a) DICOM spreads the information in the system, which means that access
to credit will be cut off; b) bank loans provide valuable information to the market, which is
an additional incentive for the borrowing firm to repay
30; c) the possibility of liquidating a
collateral, the market value of which is generally higher than the loan and whose private
value to the borrower may be even higher.
On the other hand, borrowing firms know that the bank will attempt different ways to get
paid, before going to court. This could work as a disincentive to repay the debt, since the
firm knows that the bank will negotiate in any event. If it does not work, the bank will
decide to go to court, with a low probability to collect anything, unless there is real estate as
security.
4.3.3  Private contracts
In this section we analyze bond contracts and we show how the market and the legal
framework work together to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems between
debtors and creditors
31. However we also find leasing contracts which have weaker legal
protection to creditor’s rights. The leasing contracts are governed by the General Law of
Rental Agreements, which implies that to recover the asset the lessor has to take action via
the judicial system, bearing all the costs discussed above. This kind of contracts is subject
                                                       
28 This must be done within a year as a bank can not hold an asset for more than that period of time.
29 If the debtor ha a new project the bank will agree to finance it order to share its benefits and obtain the
payments associated to the unpaid loan.
30 See Benston and Smith (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984),
for theoretical work on this topic. On the empirical side, see James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989)
and Cole (1998).
31 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a conceptual framework.42
to a different legal framework than the typical credit contract between a lender and a
borrower, therefore we will concentrate in bonds contracts.
The Superintendency of Securities and Insurance supervises public debt issues,
where the Issuing Company has to disclose all relevant information that may affect the
interests of bondholders.
Law No. 18,045 (the Capital Market Law) enacted in 1981 regulates the public
offerings of securities and their markets and intermediaries (stock exchange brokers,
stockbrokers, and security agents). Specifically, its Title XVI (Issue of Long Term Debt
Securities) establishes the procedures for the offering. Furthermore, the information has to
be disclosed on a timely basis, in addition to procedures and requirements to issue
Corporate Bonds. It includes a set of regulations that protect bondholders. For example, a
fundamental principle underlying this law states that any issuer has to fully disclose all
essential information
32 with respect to itself or the security, which should be truthful and
sufficient.
Furthermore, the Superintendency of Securities and Insurance has enforced the application
of General Rule 30 (GR 30). GR 30 contains information requirements for bond issuers and
it establishes their obligation to constantly disclose information that may affect
bondholders’ interests.
A. Bond Issue
The first requirement for a firm that issues bonds is to be registered with the
Superintendency of Securities and Insurance, involving the submission of quarterly
financial information through the FECUs
33 to this institution and also it has to disclose any
essential information about the company and the bond issue. To register a bond issue,
companies are required to submit a prospectus of the issue to the Superintendency of
Securities and Insurance that contains all the information related to the issue. This
prospectus is public information. The firm should also provide a public deed
acknowledging the shareholders’ meeting that approved the issue. Finally, it is necessary to
submit two risk ratings performed by independent risk rating companies.
34 At least two
days before the issue is placed, the firm has to publish a notice in two leading newspapers
indicating the most important information about the issue (name of the issuer, amount,
payment structure, risk ratings, etc.)
35.
                                                       
32 Essential information is defined, in the second section of Article of the Capital Market law, as information
that any individual with good judgment would consider relevant for his or her investment decision.
33 A FECU contains general information about the company (name, CUSIP, number of shareholders, twelve
major shareholders and their percentage of capital stock, CEO, etc.) and the different financial statements
(balance sheet, statement of income and cash flow statement).
34 Risk rating agencies are independent private firms registered with the Superintendency of Securities and
Insurance. The key objective of this rating is to determine the ability to pay. Companies in Chile are rated
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, C, D and E. The first one is the best rating that can be assigned and the last one is
the worst one. A D rating is assigned to issues that either do not provide enough relevant information or do
not have sufficient guarantees. All these ratings are defined in Article 88 of the Capital Market Law and in
General Rule 25 (GR25) of the Superintendency of Securities and Insurance.
35 See section 4.4. of GR 30.43
Once the issue is placed, the firm has to create a bondholder register of record stating
the number of the issue, the series, nominal value and the name of the bondholder
36. The
issuer has to give notice to the Superintendency of Securities and Insurance of any unpaid
coupon that may occur.
B. Special Rights for Bondholders
Bondholders have the special right to apply for total payment of the coupons if the issuing
firm does not pay one of them.  To do this, the bondholder needs not initiate a legal action
against the company: he or she can ask to be paid by seizing the assets of the firm. The law
establishes that the bondholder cannot waive his or her right through a covenant in the bond
contract
37. It is important to point out that any bondholder does not need the approval of the
rest of them to enforce this right.
The bondholders can sue the issuer only if they do it as a group in order to accelerate
or to obtain the coupons before the time of maturity and to file a petition of bankruptcy.
38
With respect to the representative of the bondholders, he or she can ask the General
Manager of the issuer to provide any information about the firm to protect the interests of
the bondholders. Furthermore, in the case of joint stock companies, the representative can
attend the shareholders’ meetings without the right to vote.
C. Bond Contract
The contract has to include all the characteristics of the bond issue, the rights and duties of
the issuer, the bondholders representing the others and the depository of the bonds.
The Superintendency of Securities and Insurance requires the following information to be
contained in the contract:
a)  Legal and economic information related to the issuer, the provisional bondholders
representing and the depository of the bonds.
b)  Characteristics of the issue: amount, series, number of coupons, maturity, interest
payments,  indexation, amortization, callable conditions, guarantees, convertibility
conditions and procedures to replace and exchange the bond series.
c)  Use of proceeds.
d)  Duties, limitations and constraints relative to leverage ratio; asset maintenance, asset
substitution and limitations to celebrate contracts.
e)  Cases in which breach of contract by issuer might be presumed.
f)  Rules relative to the representative and board of bondholders.
g)  The nature of arbitrage in case of conflicts, the maturity and its extinction give
preference to certain credits.
                                                       
36 See section 6 of GR 30.
37 See article 120 (second and third section) in the Capital Market Law.
38 See article 120 (fourth section) in the Capital market Law.44
Considering the incentive to dilute creditors’ claims
39, in the case of bond contracts
there is a need to establish various covenants that will protect bondholders’ wealth.
Actually, in the United States, Smith and Warner (1979) study bond covenants from a
random sample of 87 public issues of debt between 1974 and 1975 for American firms.
They find that in most of the bonds there were covenants to restrict the stockholders’
behavior. In 90.8 per cent of the bonds there were constraints on the ability to issue
additional debt, 39.1 per cent restrict merger activities, 35.6 per cent constrain the selling of
assets, and 23 per cent restrain dividend payments.
In the case of bond covenants in Chile, Araya (1998) studies a sample of 100 public
bond issues, which is the full sample of outstanding bonds by the end of 1997, taking all the
issues made in the period 1987-1997. In 97 per cent of the cases there were covenants that
restrain changes in the structure of debt payments, 88 per cent constrain the financing
policy, 80 per cent restrain the investment policy, 71 per cent require bonding activities by
the company’s management and only 4 per cent restrain the dividend policy.  Taking the
constraint on the investment policy, 56 per cent of the contracts require keeping a minimum
level of working capital and 39 per cent prohibit selling operational assets.
In terms of the financial policy, in 81 per cent of the bond contracts there are explicit
constraints to issue additional debt by controlling some financial ratios and 70 per cent
require not to use assets as collateral. In bonding activities he finds that in 67 per cent of the
issues the company is forced to insure operational assets.
5  Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzes the determinants of loan repayments in Chile. There are some
important features of the Chilean financial market that make this economy a unique case
study. Although the legal Chilean framework is based on the French Civil Law, the
economy outperforms the rest of the economies (classified in the same category) in terms of
low level of non-performing credits and capital market development. In addition, there has
been increasing competition over the nineties in the financial system, characterized by a
banking disintermediation process. This reduced margins and it led banks to look for new
market higher-risk niches (households and small business). However, this has not increased
the number of arrears in the banking system.
We grouped the plausible explanations that could enable us to understand this
performance in terms of macroeconomic environment, legal framework and private
solutions. Using monthly data for 1986-1997 we conclude that good macroeconomic
performance and the introduction of white information sharing is negatively related with
overdue loans. Moreover, the information sharing reduced the sensitiveness of unpaid loan
respect to the business cycle. In addition, using yearly data we find that good
macroeconomic performance plus major financial market reform and white information
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sharing are positive related to credit market development. Again the white information
sharing reduce the impact of the economy growth rate on credit market development.
There are other important factors that could explain the low level of arrears in the
credit market, which are difficult to include in the regression analysis. Short time series,
public data availability, some measurement problem and so on cause this problem.
However in section 4 we conducted a conceptual analysis using some stylized fact to show
the importance of access to credit, bankruptcy code, judicial system, prescreening
technique, collection technology and design of private contracts.
Considering the high increase of loans per capita during the last 20 years, limited
access to credit can hardly be an explanation for the low level of arrears in the financial
system. The amount of collateral required by the banks from households may be perceived
as “excessive”, because it exceeds the collateral required from companies. Such a large
collateral requirement could be a signal of limited access to credit for households.
However, banks are not the only institution that provides credit to households: two other
intermediaries are very active in this segment, the finance companies and department
stores. The formers are slightly more selective than the latter, since they apply a stricter
prescreening process. The department stores are less selective but operate by providing
small amounts of credit guaranteed by the purchased good. As stores’ clients have limited
access to the financial system, they are “good” debtors on account of the fact that they
crucially depend on the department store for their credit line.
The second group of explanations has to do with the quality of enforcement. La Porta
et al. found that French Civil Law countries have poorer law enforcement. Chile is no
exception. Banks are reluctant to take unpaid loans to court and prefer to reschedule the
loan (except at the time of a generalized crisis), which is a signal of an inefficient judicial
system. Also the length of lawsuits is almost two years and the bank only recovers
something when there exists some collateral. On the other hand, the cost of attorneys is
around 10 per cent of the recovered amount. Therefore, considering the time required
recovering the payments, the direct cost of a lawsuit, and the number of more efficient
alternatives to recover a loan, banks have almost no incentive to go to court.
We compared the old bankruptcy code to the new law enacted in 1982. The new code
accelerates the proceedings as compared with the old one, and also compared with more
developed countries, since it sets a one-year limit for asset liquidation. Another important
feature is that unsecured creditors have the right to participate in the creditors' committee
and to vote during the process, which enables them to protect their rights. The creditors'
committee designates the bankruptcy receiver, who is a private agent that manages the firm
during the proceedings, determines who the debtors are, liquidates the assets and pays the
creditors.
The third group of explanations includes what we called private solutions. The first
one is information sharing, which in Chile started as a private initiative in 1979, but only in
1989 the system began to handle private black and white information on banks’ debtors.
This information is only available to the banks. This had a positive impact on both the
banking system development and in the reduction of non-performing loans. On the other46
hand, black information is available to everybody.  It seems important to clarify that
Department Stores are reluctant to share white information, and consequently they do not
have any information of their clients’ debt with the banking system. However, they do not
display high levels of arrears. In our opinion, the reason for this is that stores’ debtors have
limited access to the credit market, so if they do not pay they are barred from it.
The prescreening technique in the case of firms has performed well, especially due to
the close supervision exerted by the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions.
In the case of households, they are applying the scoring technique, which has performed
well in reducing arrears, but tends to reject too may debtors who are good payers.
Another element is collection technology, which has been improving in Chile, given
the reduction in the telecommunications cost and technological development. This has
made collection from households more efficient with banks outsourcing it to specialized
collection agencies. In the case of firms, banks use a different strategy. They have an
internal “normalization department” that seeks to negotiate an agreement with the firm.
Only after all renegotiations has failed or the debtor has turned out to be dishonest, the case
is taken to the court, where proceedings are very slow. Even when collateral exists, banks
need a special order from the court to liquidate the assets.
Finally we analyzed the case of bond financing. Here, the dispersed nature of
debtholders make them more exposed to the danger of dilution by the debtor than in the
case of bank debt. To help the bond market overcomes this potentially greater obstacle
arising from moral hazard, the Chilean law has granted to the holders of public bond issues
a special protection that obliges the issuer to disclose all relevant information that may
affect the interests of bondholders. In addition, bondholders invariable protect their
interests further by inserting in bond contract covenants that limit the borrower’s discretion.
In summary, reform of the bankruptcy code, information sharing, collection
technology, financial market regulations and macroeconomic environment seem to play a
key role to explain the performance of the financial system in terms of low default rate. To
the contrary, the performance of the judicial system does not contribute to explain such
performance.47
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